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SOUTHEAST ASIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH JAPAN
An Indonesian technocrat was quoted as saying that trade,
investment and aid represented "three cards in one hand,"I Japan
deals in Southeast Asia. Cartomantic language aside, this view of the
three factors as constituting an integrated Japanese thrust into the
area is very prevalent among many Southeast Asians. Few believe
for example that Japanese aid giving is totally altruistic in intent and
unrelated to commercial aims. 2 However, all these three factors did
not make their impact in Japanese economic relations with Southeast
Asia after the Second World War all at one time. They did so at
different periods. Japanese economic relations in the fifties and
sixties comprised overwhelmingly of trade while investment and aid
became significant only later.
While it may have made perfect sense for Japan to consider
Southeast Asia as an alternative to its lost colonies in East Asia,
Southeast Asia was less enchanted with such a view. Southeast
Asians had no wish after the Second World War to have their region
continue as the mere suppliers of raw materials for and the market
for value added products from industrial countries like Japan or any
other as they had been for the western colonialists. There had
already developed a profound desire not only for political
independence but also for industrialization. However, Southeast
Asians did not make this an issue in the fifties and early sixties
because of two reasons.
One was that many Southeast Asian countries in the fifties
were still in the throes of the independence struggle. In 1951, when
Japan resumed its relations with Southeast Asia as an independent
country, only three countries, the Philippines, Burma and Indonesia
were freed from colonial rule. The then Malaya only received its
independence from the British in 1957 (Singapore only joined
Malaysia in 1963 and left it as an independent nation in 1965).3 The
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three countries of Indochina, especially Vietnam, were still involved
in a violent struggle against the French who left only in 1954. 4 Thus,
the preoccupation for independence of Southeast Asia in the forties
and early fifties left Southeast Asia little time to struggle against
foreign economic domination. Though both the political and
economic struggle were not unrelated, the latter only became
important from the late fifties.
And when it came among certain Southeast Asian countries, it
was directed primarily against western interests because they
constituted the overwhelming portion of foreign economic interests
in Southeast Asia then. Thus in 1957, Indonesia nationalized many
of the Dutch (and also ethnic Chinese) economic interests in
Indonesia while the Philippines were concerned about ending the
Laurel-Langley agreement which was deemed too favourable to
American interests. 5 By contrast, Japanese economic interests were
very small. Japan could not make much headway in the fifties
because they had to settle the reparations problem with Southeast
Asia before they could really accelerate their economic involvement.
Their small stake can be seen from the trade statistics in 1959, a
year after Japan settled the reparations issue with the largest
Southeast Asian country, Indonesia. In that year, Japanese trade
with the five countries of Southeast Asia which were to constitute
ASEAN6 later amounted to only 11.1 percent of the total trade of
these five countries. There was then little or no Japanese investment
to speak of. Neither was there any Japanese aid as Southeast Asians
did not consider the reparations payments as such. 7
Things however changed in the sixties and seventies. So
successful was the Japanese economic penetration that trade rose
dramatically. Where Japanese trade with ASEAN as a percentage of
ASEAN's total trade was 11.1 in 1959, that percentage rose to 29.3 in
1973. This represented a rise of 18 percentage points and a
threefold increase in a period of only fourteen years! It soon
dawned on many Southeast Asians that they were not only dealing
with a country of great economic consequence to them, but also from
a disadvantaged position.
There was first the feeling of dependence on Japan in the
volume of trade. While their trade with Japan had rocketed as a
2
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percentage of their total trade, it hardly moved on the Japanese side.
Japanese trade with ASEAN as a percentage of total Japanese trade
was about 11 in 1959 (almost similar to the ASEAN percentage) but
came to only 10.7 in 1973! Measured in GDP terms, the percentage
of Japan-ASEAN trade as a percentage of total ASEAN GDP came to
16.1, while as a percentage of Japanese GDP, it came to only 2.43.8
This dependency feeling was aggravated by the perception of
some Southeast Asians that in some critical commodities such as oil,
Japan was a crucial market for the exporter without Japan being too
dependent on that particular exporter. An example is that of
Indonesian oil exports in the sixties and seventies. Its share of total
Indonesian exports, according to two Indonesian scholars rose from a
moderate level of 44.8 percent in 1969 to a high of 74.8 percent and
then to 63.9 percent in 1978. Japan's share of such exports however
showed no similar rise. It remained stagnant at around 47-49 percent of
Indonesia's total oil exports for example in the period 1975-78.9
While many Japanese might argue that taking about a 50 percentage
share of Indonesian oil exports was no small matter and constituted
no small percentage of total Japanese oil imports and may indicate
some dependence, 10 this was not perceived as such by the same
Indonesian scholars who wrote rather starkly that Japanese policy
here had been to "avoid too strong a dependency on a single source,
and this only serves to heighten Indonesian dependency. Indonesia's
position vis-a-vis Japan," they continued, "on the other hand, remains
as vulnerable as ever, as it is unable to diversify either its export
commodities or its buyers, while Indonesia's lifeline is becoming too
dependent on Japan's willingness to buy Indonesia's oil." l l While
there may be some exaggeration here, the use of the metaphor 'lifeline" for
Indonesian trade with Japan is striking. That metaphor is normally used by
Japanese and others to describe Japanese dependence on Southeast
Asia, particularly the Straits of Malacca for which Indonesia is the most
important littoral state. At least for these Indonesian intellectuals,
the shoe is now on the other foot i.e. the Southeast Asian one!
A second source of grievance among many Southeast Asians
was the structure of Southeast Asian exports to Japan. Table 1, for
example, lists the exports of ASEAN to Japan in 1972/73 just before
the anti-Tanaka riots of 1974.
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Table 112
Commodity Composition of Exports by the ASEAN Countries
to Japan, 1972/73 (US$ million, percentages in parentheses)
SITC Group Exports to Japan
0. Food and Live Animals 249 (9.0)
1. Beverages and Tobacco 5 (0.2)
2. Crude Materials, excluding Fuels 1,145 (41.5)
3. Mineral Fuel, etc. 1,037 (31.6)
4. Animals and Vegetable Oils and Fats 24 (0.9)
5. Chemicals 14 (0.5)
6. Basic Manufactures 227 (8.2)
7. Machinery and Transport Equipment 1 6 (0.6)
8. Miscellaneous Manufactured Goods 1 6 (0.6)
9. Goods not classified 2 6 (0.9)
The overwhelming composition of ASEAN exports as seen from
the Table were in raw materials with mineral fuel constituting as
much as 32.0%. Manufactured goods (items 6, 7 and 8) came to only
9.4%, with a total value of US$259 million. (ASEAN total exports of
these three items of manufactures for the same year came to
US$2,236 million.) 13 In other words, ASEAN exports to Japan of
manufactures as a percentage of total ASEAN exports to that country
came to about 10%14 while 90% were in non-manufactures such as
raw materials. This shows that by the early seventies Japan had
succeeded only too well in its original intention of treating Southeast
Asia as a source of raw materials. The words of two Thai scholars in
describing Thailand's economic relations with Japan in the 1970s also
applied to Southeast Asia as a whole. The composition of trade
between the two countries, they wrote, "reflects the classic
relationship of a resource-poor industrialized country with an
agriculturally based developing country." 15 Such a relationship was
not necessarily conducive to the industrialization of Southeast Asia.
A third complaint was that Japan exported more to Southeast
Asia than imported from the area (even if the bulk of such imports
were raw materials). Except for countries like Malaysia and
Indonesia which enjoyed a surplus in the seventies with Japanl 6
(and in the Indonesian case primarily because of oil exports) much of
4
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the rest of Southeast Asia suffered trade deficits with Japan. A Thai
scholar, whose country had a chronic trade deficit with Japan went as
far as to write that the "problem of trade deficits is regarded as
inherent in ASEAN-Japan trade relations." 17 While the trade deficit
per se maybe bad enough for its drain on the foreign reserves, what
made Southeast Asians critical was their perception of the reasons
for such deficits. While willing to admit that many Japanese
products were in demand because of their superior quality, many
Southeast Asians believed that the Japanese market on the other
hand were somewhat closed to their products. Among the rather
unfair methods to restrict Southeast Asian products in the Japanese
market, wrote the same Thai scholar, were "differential tariff rates
for markets in raw form as against the processed form, quota
restrictions, and price and order disruption." 1 8
The Anti-Tanaka Riots
With the exception of some Japanese, 1 9 the Japanese government
as a whole were not very aware of rising Southeast Asian resentment
against the Japanese economic presence; or if they were aware, they
did little to meet Southeast Asian grievances, professing to separate
economics from politics always. Moreover, there was nothing of a
dramatic nature to jolt the Japanese from this complacency. Until
January 1974, that is. In that year, the then Japanese prime minister
Kakuei Tanaka began a tour of the five countries of ASEAN. To his
and the Japanese nation's surprise (Tanaka apparently thought of his
visit as no more than a routine one) 2 0 he was greeted with anti-
Japanese demonstrations which were particularly intense in Bangkok
and Jakarta. In the latter city, Tanaka had to leave by a military
base as demonstrating crowds made it difficult for him to leave by
the civilian airport.
Whatever be the reasons for the anti-Tanaka riots, they have as
an underlying reason the economic factor. An examination of the
varied responses among the five ASEAN countries would show that
where the demonstrations were most intense (as in Indonesia and
Thailand) were in those countries where the economic grievances
mentioned were most salient. While the Philippines, Malaysia and
Singapore experienced little or no demonstrations because such
5
grievances were less in evidence. This can be seen first from an
analysis of each country's trade with Japan. The two figures below
represent such trade graphically.
Figure 1
Percentage of Each ASEAN Country's Trade with Japan
of the Total Trade of that ASEAN Country
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Figure 221
Percentage of Japanese Trade with Each ASEAN Country
as a Percentage of Total Japanese Trade
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From the above graphs, Indonesia and Thailand shared two very
important characteristics, the huge and rapid manner their trade
increase with Japan in the decade or so before 1973, while making
only a very small impact on Japan's overall trade. The Indonesian
case is particularly striking. From a percentage of 9.2 in 1959, it shot
up to 55.9 in 1971 and 52,5 in 1973. By contrast, Japanese trade
with Indonesia accounted only for 1.8, 3.0 and 4.1 percent
respectively for the same three years. To have more than half of
your overall trade dependent on one particular country is quite
extraordinary for an independent country in Southeast Asia. It
maybe much of it consisted of oil. But as suggested earlier, the
dependence is no less as Japan had become a very critical market. In
the Thai case, there was a rise from 17.8% in 1959 to 30.8% in 1973
while the figures for Japan in the same years were 2.6 and 1.6
respectively. While it may not be as striking as Indonesia, it is still
an impressive percentage.
The sudden rise also suggests an instability in the trade
relations. If the process had been more gradual, than Indonesia and
Thailand could have time to adjust to what is sometimes called the
"overpresence" of Japan.2 2 Or in other words, there was not enough
time for Southeast Asians to learn to live with a powerful Japanese
economic influence and the unfamiliar social and cultural practices of
the Japanese. Otherwise, this Japanese "overpresence" could only
serve fuel for politicians to exploit for their own purposes.
As a matter of fact, the Tanaka visit also coincided with political
disturbances in Indonesia and Thailand. In Indonesia then, a rivalry
had developed between two top generals, Sumitro and Ali Moertopo,
who was perceived to have President Suharto's backing. The Tanaka
visit provided General Sumitro the opportunity to channel the
discontent aroused by the Japanese presence to hit at Ali Moertopo
and ultimately the Indonesian government. On the Thai part, there
was then a very vocal student movement which were not too pro-
government because of what the students saw as undue military
influence in* the Thai government and that government's links with
foreign, particularly Japanese interests. Tanaka's visit provided the
spark for the students to demonstrate both against Japan and the
Thai government.
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There were two other economic reasons that were relevant to
explain the riots. In Indonesia, a lot of the Japanese investment
before 1973 went to textile manufacturing leading to Japanese
partnership with ethnic Chinese because they were more efficient.
This had the effect of driving out of business many of the less
efficient pribumi (indigeneous Indonesians) textile manufacturers as
to further create resentment against Japan. The other was the trade
deficit suffered by Thailand in its Japanese trade. The figures of
Thailand's total trade and trade with Japan in the ten years
preceding 1973 are quite revealing.
Table 223
Thailand: Direction of Trade and Trade Balance with
Japan in Every Two Years from 1963-1973 (in million US$)
Exports Imports Trade Balance
..---------------- Japan as
Year Total Japan Total Japan Total Japan % of Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)=(1)-(3) (6)=(2)-(4) (7)=(6)/(5)
1963 466 91 617 181 -151 -90 59.6
1965 622 131 778 219 -156 -88 56.4
1967 681 160 1,067 341 -386 -181 46.9
1969 708 167 1,293 434 -585 -267 45.6
1971 831 230 1,288 445 -457 -215 47.0
1973 1,564 394 2,049 720 -485 -326 67.2
The figures show that the deficit in Thai-Japan trade of the
total Thai deficit never fell below 45 percent while reaching a high of
67.2 percent just before the Tanaka visit. Japan was thus a constant
drain on Thai foreign reserves. Indeed, a Thai study stated that one
"basic problem in Thailand-Japan trade is the persistent trade deficit,
which has always been an issue of dispute between the two
countries". 2 4 The study went on to say it was in fact the key issue in
relations between Thailand and Japan. It is not surprising then anti-
Japanese demonstrators played on this issue.
The Filipino case bears similarity with Thai and Indonesian
cases both in volume and rapid rise but there was not much anti-
Japanese agitation. This could be explained in terms of the control
8
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the Marcos government then had over the political system, and on an
economic plane, there was not the emotive issue of the massive trade
deficit the Thais experienced in the years preceding 1973. The
deficit the Filipinos experienced with Japan only became persistent
after 1975. The figures for the Philippines for the past ten years
before 1973 are as follows.
Table 325
Philippines: Direction of Trade and Trade Balance with
Japan in Every Two Years from 1963-1973 (in million US$)
Exports Imports Trade Balance
Year Total Japan Total Japan Total Japan
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)=(1)-(3) (6)=(2)-(4)
1963 771 230 716 150 +55 +80
1965 796 254 928 240 -132 +14
1967 891 374 1,179 363 -283 +11
1969 983 468 1,327 476 -344 -8
1971 1,189 514 1,405 465 -216 +49
1973 1,837 820 1,790 620 +47 +200
Thus, this suggests that while Filipinos may not be totally
satisfied with Japanese economic relations, it in the main enjoyed a
surplus with Japan in the decade before 1973. There was no great
drain on foreign reserves to Japan then as was the case with
Thailand.
Malaysia and Singapore did not have very high percentages of
their trade with Japan of their total trade. Even though Singapore's
trade with Japan rose quite rapidly from 1963 to 1973, i.e. from 5.3%
to 14.2, 14.2% was not as high a percentage as compared to more
than 50% for Indonesia. Moreover, Singapore then was a country
still very dependent on trade, and would normally welcome a high
volume of trade without too much regard to the composition of that
trade or the trade deficit. The Malaysian trade deficit with Japan in
the few years before 1973 was not very great, while the Japanese,
using a different method of calculation, insist that their figures show
a Malaysian surplus rather than a deficit. 2 6 Thus, the figures
supplied by the Malaysian Central Bank for the years 1970-1973
9
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regarding Malaysia's trade with Japan are (in RM million) (Bank
Negara, Quarterly Economic Bulletin)
Table 4
Year Exports Imports Trade Balance
1970 939 767 +172
1971 912.4 876.9 +35.5
1972 832.9 1,053.7 -220.8
1973 1,336.1 1,448.8 -112.7
as supplied by the Japanese Ministry of Finance (in US$ million)
Table 5
Year Exports Imports Trade Balance
1970 419 166 +253
1971 373 204 +169
1972 396 264 +132
1973 776 448 +328
Even accepting the Malaysian figures, the deficit began in 1972
and was not really much of an issue before the Tanaka visit.
Moreover, in 1974 the political situation was relatively stable in both
countries with no split within the governments of each of the two
countries.
The anti-Tanaka riots had left a deep impression on the
Japanese. They became aware that their relations with Southeast
Asia could not be blithely ignored, and sought to improve relations
with that area, ensuring that there will not be a repeat of the
demonstrations. Whatever be the steps the Japanese government
undertook subsequently, developments in the economic arena after
the riots have to some extent, even if not entirely, reduced some of
the reasons for Southeast Asian grievances. One was the reduction
10
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and stabilization of total ASEAN-Japan trade as a percentage of total
ASEAN trade. As can be seen from Figure 1, Chapter 1, this
percentage which reached a height of about 30% in 1973 declined in
subsequent years steadily to a percentage of about 21 in 1989.
Considering Indonesia and Thailand where the demonstrations were
the most intense, the percentage of Indonesia-Japan trade as a
percentage of total Indonesian trade dropped from a height of about
56 and 53 in 1971 and 1973 to about 36 in 1989. Similarly, the
percentage of Thailand-Japan trade of total Thai trade fell from
about 31 to about 23 in 1989 (see Figure 1). Whatever be the
reasons, such declines suggest the ASEAN countries have a lesser
sense of dependence on Japan as far as volume of trade is concerned.
Second, the composition of trade generated less heat, especially
after the mid-80's. One reason was the collapse of the commodity
prices in the mid-80's and the recession that collapse induced.
Confronted with the need to export more as one way to overcome the
recession, Southeast Asian countries found they needed the Japanese
market more than before, even if the bulk of their exports still
consisted of commodities. The reality of some dependence on the
Japanese market had to be accepted.
Third, the trade deficit, while still an important factor in
bilateral Japanese trade relations with the ASEAN countries, has
become a less intense issue because of the composition of imports
from Japan. Much of the trade deficit in the years after the mid-
seventies, and especially after the revaluation of the yen in the mid-
eighties came from the import of capital goods from Japan necessary
for the industrialization of the importing countries. In the category
of "machinery and transport equipment", the bulk of which would
represent capital goods, ASEAN imports of such have increased. In
1972/73, they constituted 40.3% of total ASEAN imports from Japan.
It rose however to 52.3% in 1978/79.27 Especially after 1986 when
Japan's increased exports to ASEAN have been led by intermediate
goods and machinery equipment such as are needed for ASEAN
factories, this has led to an increase in the trade deficit in many
ASEAN countries. But it is difficult to criticize such imports without
being critical of the industrialization programmes of these Southeast
Asian countries accepting such imports.
11
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Fourth, economic relations after the Fukuda Doctrine have
become more "balanced" in that Japanese aid and investment became
significant. A primarily trading relationship particularly between an
industrialized country and a group of developing countries can easily
open itself up to charges of unequal relationship or exploitation by
the industrial country and so on. While aid-giving and investment
are not without problems (indeed many charge they further
entrench the exploitation of the developing countries), they
nevertheless temper any exploitative relations by contributing to
development through the transfer of technology, the alleviation of
poverty and the like. As far as Japanese aid-giving is concerned,
there is a very marked increase after the Fukuda Doctrine of 1977.
This arises from the fact that Official Development Assistance or ODA
is a government to government relationship, unlike trade and
investment, and aid amounts can be decreased or increased very
quickly by governmental decisions. Figure 3 shows total Japanese
ODA to the five countries of ASEAN from 1969 to 1989.
Figure 32 8
Amount of Japanese ODA to the Five ASEAN Countries
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The graph shows a big climb from 1978 onwards reflecting the
aid from the Fukuda Doctrine and the ODA-doubling plan of Japan.2 9
The climb after 1973 came about as a result of the high appreciation
of the yen and the increase in aid to resource-rich countries after the
12
oil crisis. The big jump after 1986 came about because of the
massive revaluation of the yen after 1985.
Japanese investment to ASEAN did not show any marked
increase immediately after the Fukuda Doctrine. Even if Japanese
government officials may exhort Japanese industry to invest more to
help Southeast Asia develop, Japanese industry nevertheless make
the decisions to invest according to their own lights. There was an
increase in 1973 (because of the Japanese awareness of the need to
invest in the exploitation of resources in Southeast Asia)30 and a
very marked increase after 1986 because of the yen revaluation.
Nevertheless, as seen in Table 6, the amount of investment in the
two years of 1974 (the time of the anti-Tanaka riots) and 1975 came
to US$1,419 million which is only slightly less than the cumulative
total of US$1,482 million in the years from 1951-1973!
Table 631
Japanese Direct Investment in ASEAN (US$ million)
Years Total
1951-69 376
1970 114
1971 153
1972 214
1973 625
1974 564
1975 855
1976 1,044
1977 636
1978 917
1979 595
1980 926
1981 2,834
1982 801
1983 973
1984 906
1985 935
1986 865
1987 1,524
1988 2,713
1989 4,684
1990 4,082
1991 3,696
13
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Investment
The events that led to the Fukuda Doctrine naturally had an
influence on Japanese investment in Southeast Asia. Except for the
oil crisis of 1973 however, such influence was indirect in that a
greater Japanese government commitment to ASEAN and the
favourable ASEAN reception to the Fukuda Doctrine created a climate
of opinion Japanese investors might find comfortable; and that some
lessons could have been learned from some of these events as to
caution Japanese investors about certain of their practices. But there
was no great increase in amount of investment immediately after the
Fukuda Doctrine. The real turning point, apart from the earlier one
in the late 60's and 70's came after the revaluation of the yen after
1985 when Japanese investment in Southeast Asia changed
markedly both in scale and character. See below for a graph of
Japanese investment in ASEAN.
Figure 43 2
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As can be seen from the graph, Japanese investment climbed
steadily upwards from the early 70's and sustained another massive
climb from the mid 80's after the revaluation of the yen. The
spectacular jump in 1981 was an aberration and due entirely to a
very big investment in Indonesia in 1981 on some resource
14
1~~1~~~·1__~~_ _ _ ^-- --. -_ __ _1--·---·-141
extraction project. (In 1981, of a total of US$2,834 million Japanese
investment in ASEAN, US$2,434 went to Indonesia.) 3 3
The aims of Japanese investment in Southeast Asia from the
beginning had been the exploitation of the natural resources of the
area, and second, import substitution i.e. to overcome the tariffs of
the recipient countries against foreign products by setting up
factories to assemble Japanese products there, and third, to some
extent the relocation of Japanese industries because of high wage
considerations in Japan and other factors such as pollution and so on.
Japanese investment received a spurt in the late 60's and early 70's
because of a variety of developments. These were the liberalization
of foreign investment regulations in 1969 in Japan, the revaluation of
the yen as a result of the international currency developments of the
early 1970's such as the collapse of the Bretton Woods system
(1971-1973) and an increasing concenr for the environment and
stricter regulations in Japan. 3 4 The last two reasons stimulated
Japanese investment especially in labour-intensive sectors and for
the extraction of natural resources.
Southeast Asia before the mid-80's on its part was somewhat
ambivalent towards Japanese investment in particular and foreign
investment in general. Governments and domestic capital in some
Southeast Asian countries such as in Indonesia and Malaysia (where
state capital was expanding) fear competition from foreign
investment. It could also be politically destabilizing as it could
strengthen that part of domestic capital which is ethnic Chinese
(though this is less of a concern in Thailand and Singapore) even
though some domestic capital welcome foreign investment only up to
a point as it would compete with them. Yet, Southeast Asian
governments did not completely close the door as they recognised
that foreign capital could contribute benefits, particularly new
technology, additional employment and raise efficiency level in
domestic firms exposed to competition.
It is in such a context that the "old wave" of Japanese
investment i.e. pre-1985, to use the term used by a Thai scholar, 35 as
opposed to the "new wave" after 1985 that Japanese direct foreign
investment is viewed. And it is in the old wave Japanese investment
that many Southeast Asians found somewhat unsatisfactory. Most of
15
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their grievances applied to all the ASEAN countries while some are
specific to one or two Southeast Asian countries.
One very general complaint was that Japanese investors are
very reluctant to transfer technology. This holds true for both the
less advanced and more advanced countries of ASEAN. A joint study
of Japanese investment in Thailand stated that empirical evidence on
the operation of Japanese joint ventures in Thailand tend to "suggest
that technology transfer in Japanese-invested firms is not significant,
if it exists at all."3 6 While another study on Singapore complained of
the fact that Japanese companies in Singapore have been "slow in
upgrading their operations despite their governments repeated calls
for automation and mechanization." 3 7 Technology transfer of course
can take many forms such as ranging from the complete transfer of
sophisticated techniques to the simple operation of imported
machines. But according to two Thai scholars, 3 8 the most critical
contribution pertains to the transfer of "software" technologies, that
is, skills relating to management, accounting techniques, foremen and
so on. One crucial indicator of this "software" transfer is whether
Japanese firms put more locals in top management. And it is the
unanimous opinion of Southeast Asians that this is not the case.
Three Indonesian scholars summed it up by saying that the Japanese
are unwilling to hire Indonesian managers. Instead, Japanese
companies appeared to rely heavily on frequent rotation of Japanese
managers and this is generally perceived as a method to retain
decision-making processes in the hands of the parent companies in
Japan.3 9 This is backed up by a study conducted by non-Japanese or
Southeast Asians which say that indigenisation in Southeast Asian
Japanese firms "has occured at the lower levels of management, but
has been slow at the higher echelons. In terms of management
functions, indigenisation has proceeded much faster in the areas of
personnel and public relations, but slowest in the vital areas of
finance, production, marketing and purchasing." 4 0
The Japanese would counter by saying that technology transfer
is a complex process not easily done in a day. As they see it, there
are not enough trained locals to take up management jobs (and if
there were there is a high turnover rate); while complaining of the
difficulty of purchasing sub-components from local sources as most
16
are not of the requisite quality (more purchases will give local
suppliers ability to upgrade their technology). Southeast Asians
would reply that as this is a relationship between developed and
developing countries and the complexity aside, Japanese companies
have some responsibility to go out of the way to transfer technology.
By contrast, Southeast Asians point to western companies using more
locals for management posts as compared to Japanese firms. 4 1
A second general complaint was that Japanese investment does
not lead to a significant increase in employment. It tended to be
focussed on small sized companies, except for a few resource
exploitative projects. For example, a study on Japanese firms in
Malaysia before 1979 showed that most of the firms were of quite
small size.4 2 Indonesian scholars wrote that Japanese investments
do not contribute much to the "solution of employment problems in
Indonesia." 4 3 Two Thai scholars, while conceding that the absolute
amount of employment generated by Japanese joint ventures appear
to be substantial, nevertheless noted that they "really accounted for
only a small fraction of the total workforce in Thailand." 4 4
A third general complaint pertained to Japanese firms not
contributing to regional development in that they tend to be situated
in the more developed parts of the country thus accentuating the
regional imbalance. While this is typical of most foreign investors
and not of Japanese investors specifically, it is nevertheless a cause
of complaint. Thus, a Thai study noted that most "Japanese joint
ventures appears to be located in Bangkok and the nearby
provinces." 4 5 Another study on Malaysia stated that "the Japanese
firms located in Malaysia were, generally, of medium and small size,
and have preferred to be situated in developed regions such as Kuala
Lumpur, Selangor, Penang and Johore. By thus concentrating job-
creation in already developed regions to the relative neglect of less-
developed ones, these firms have not fulfilled one of the major social
and economic expectations of DFI in Malaysia."4 6 And in Indonesia
for the 1967-80 period, 92 percent of Japan's planned investment
projects were located in the island of Java.4 7
There were some complaints that are specific to certain
countries but one of the most important had been that Japanese
investment created what was termed by some Indonesian scholars as
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"socio-economic dualism," 4 8 a situation that accentuates the modern
economy from the traditional Indonesian economy. By that was
meant Japanese investors tended to team up with ethnic Chinese
business leading to competition, if not the destruction of the local
pribumi (indigenous Indonesian) business, though they conceded
that it is understandable as the Japanese firms seek partners who
have past experiences with Japanese firms, who own or manage
marketing institutions and are intimately acquainted with the
Indonesian trading system. There are relatively, they wrote, "few
pribumi Indonesians who fill these qualifications, and hence the
tendency to use non-pribumi (ethnic Chinese) partners." 4 9
Southeast Asians put up with these Japanese investments
because it was felt Japanese and foreign investments in general are
needed (though in the Indonesian case, Japanese investment had
been one of the contributory reasons to the riots). But ambivalence
towards foreign investments and Japanese investments in particular
lessened after the mid-80's despite the persistence of some of these
patterns of Japanese investment. One reason was the change of heart
towards foreign investment by the ASEAN governments. This was
brought about by the recession induced by a decline in world trade
and the over supply of primary commodities which depressed
commodity prices in world markets. Growth rates slowed markedly
after 1981 and slumped in 1985 and 1986. In countries like
Indonesia and Malaysia the fall in oil prices in 1984 greatly added to
their financial woes. The ASEAN governments realised they needed
a lot of foreign investment to help them out of the recession, and
made many changes in their regulations to favour foreign investors.
At the same time, the massive revaluation of the yen after the
Plaza Accord of 1985 was a traumatic experience for Japanese
industry. It made Japanese wages so high that Japanese investors
had to relocate greatly overseas, particularly in Southeast Asia, not
only for import substitution purposes but for export back to Japan
and to third countries. In other words to be more globally
competitive, Japan had to invest in ASEAN for export, where once
resource-exploitation and import substitution were the major
considerations. The new wave investment was different in scale and
amount.
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One major change in scale is the greater industrial integration
emerging across ASEAN under Japanese investment where Japanese
firms build up pan-Asian networks through foreign investment in
collaborating with their affiliates and through marketing links with
non-Japanese companies. This is to ensure a supply of low cost
components and parts outside Japan.
Because now the Japanese had to rely for cheaper, local sources
of supply of parts and components where they once relied on
Japanese firms (now too expensive) which force many Japanese sub-
contract firms to relocate to ASEAN to continue supplying their
parent firm. But local sourcing also involves sub-contracts to local
firms to make parts under license. Thus, some initial data from a
survey carried out by JETRO in late 1987 showed an increase in local
content among Japanese subsidiaries.
Table 750
Changes in the Ratio of Local Content among
Japanese Affiliates in ASEAN, August 1987 Compared with the
Period Before September 1985 (in percentages)
Increase No Decrease Total
Substantially Change
Food 16.7 75.0 8.3 100 (24)
Textile 40.5 59.5 0 100 (37)
Wood Products 14.3 85.7 0 100 (7)
Petroleum and 51.8 48.2 0 100 (56)
Chemical Products
Metal and Non- 35.1 62.2 2.7 100 (37)
metallic Products
General Machinery 58.8 41.2 0 100 (17)
Electrical Machinery 69.2 28.6 2.2 100 (91)
and Electronics
Transport Equipment 55.6 44.4 0 100 (45)
Others 57.4 42.6 0 100 (47)
Note: Number of affiliates in brackets.
Source: JETRO, Report of a Survey on Conditions of Japanese Affiliates in
ASEAN (Tokyo, March 1988), in Japanese.
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There are some Southeast Asians who see this integration of
ASEAN into Japanese industry as encouraging a new international
division of labour in East Asia, presumably disapproving of the low
scale in which ASEAN would be in with Japan dominating. But
Southeast Asian governments and many other Southeast Asians have
not seen it this way. One can say with some assurance now, ASEAN
seems to have muted its criticism of Japanese investment because of
this "new wave" pattern.
Japanese Aid
While Japanese aid, in terms of the amount to Southeast Asia,
particularly to the ASEAN countries, may not be as large as its trade
and investment, nevertheless it is very significant compared to aid
from other countries. Japan's ODA to the ASEAN countries exceeded
the economic and military assistance of the United States, the other
big donor, after 1972. It went far beyond it after 1978. "The total
amount of Japan's ODA to ASEAN countries in 1987 (US$1.68 billion)
was", according to one scholar "five or six times larger than US
economic aid (US$0.29 billion). Most of this US aid went to the
Philippines (US$0.23 billion in 1987). " 5 1 As an example of the
comparative amounts of bilateral aid (concessional loan) by other
developed countries, take an ASEAN country like Malaysia for the
year 1984 to 1986, Table 8 shows the following.5 2
Table 8
ODA Loan Commitment to Malaysia (RM million)
Source 1984 1985 1986 1984-1986
(%) (%) (%) Total (%)
Japan 229.5 107.3 155.0 491.8
(63.6) (51.0) (47.6) (54.8)
Australia 48.5 43.1 34.5 126.1
(13.4) (20.5) (10.6) (14.1)
United Kingdom 6.3 3.3 92.2 101.8
(1.7) (1.6) (28.3) (11.3)
France 30.3 20.8 71.4 58.5
(8.4) (9.9) (2.3) (6.5)
Germany, Fed. Rep. 7.2 4.0 10.7 21.9
(2.0) (1.9) (3.3) (2.4)
Canada 9.7 7.9 4.3 21.9
(2.7) (3.8) (1.3) (2.4)
- -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . - - - - - - - -
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From the figures, Japan's aid is way ahead (54.8%) compared to
its nearest rival, Australia which contributed 14.1 percent of the
total. And, if one were to compare the amount of Japanese ODA to
the ASEAN countries to the total amount of aid the ASEAN countries
received from all sources, it was well above a third for the years
from 1978 to 1989, as Figure 5 below shows.5 3
Figure 5
Percentage of Japan's ODA of Total Aid from
All Sources Received by ASEAN
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As Japanese aid made its impact, so did Southeast Asian
reaction to it become more evident. There is a general perception,
particularly on the official level, that Japanese aid is needed. "It is
an indisputable fact," wrote a top Malaysian official in a conference
on Japanese aid to ASEAN, "that development assistance, whether in
the form of grants, technical assistance, or concessional loans,
supplements scarce resources of developing nations and contributes
to their social and economic progress." 54 Because of this need and
the belief in the cost effectiveness of Japan's ODA to Malaysia (a
belief also shared by Thai officialdom), 5 5 Malaysia is particularly
critical of the fact that Malaysia and other more developed countries
of ASEAN may soon reach a certain stage of development measured
by Gross National Product per capita, that would make them
ineligible for Official Development Assistance from developed
countries, including Japan. 5 6
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A perception of need does not however coincide with a
charitable interpretation of motivation. The belief is widespread in
Southeast Asia that Japanese aid is not altruistic in intent but is
given primarily to advance Japanese economic interests. This belief
holds true across the Southeast Asian ideological spectrum. The late
prime minister of Malaysia, Tengku Abdul Rahman once described
Japanese aid as akin to usury. "Although Japan furnishes loans," the
Tengku was quoted as saying, "it takes back with its other hand as if
by magic, almost twice the amount that it provide." 57 A survey of 32
Thai members of parliament and a group of 100 most of whom came
from the Thai managerial class revealed that these two groups tend
to confuse Japanese aid with Japanese investment. 5 8 While a
Malaysian social critic writes that "Japan hardly deserves credit as
the world's top foreign aid donor since the main consideration behind
much of its ODA is to provide business for and to otherwise support
and favour the business interests of its private companies." 5 9
Whether such uncharitable views are a result of a lack of
sophisticated understanding of the Japanese aid-giving process or of
a stubborn refusal to believe in Japanese altruism, it must be said it
is quite understandable, given the nature of Japanese aid before the
1980's. Previous to that Japanese ODA came under the label of
Japanese economic cooperation, which also included the term other
official flows (OOF) that involved loans by the Japanese Export
Import Bank which may not be concessional in nature. In addition
OOF also included private investment flows. Only after the early 80's
did the Japanese government begin to refer to "aid" and "ODA" in
order to separate the commercial and developmental uses of
economic assistance. 60 Small wonder such uncharitable views exist
as they are given such linguistic assistance.
Further adding to Southeast Asian perception of the linkage of
aid with Japanese commercial aims is the manner in which aid is, or
rather is not, coordinated. There are four ministries in Japan, the
Ministries of Finance, Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and
the Economic Planning Agency which are charged with implementing
Japanese ODA. Yet, there are as many as 16 Japanese offices that
have budgets that include money for ODA.6 1 Some of such offices
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may have used such ODA, either directly or indirectly, for
commercial purposes.
But what of the actual situation. Here an examination of
concessional loans by the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund
(OECF), the Japanese agency in charge of concessional loans, to one
Southeast Asian country, Malaysia before 1989, broken down by
sectors, is quite revealing.
Table 9
OECF Loans by Sector to Malaysia
(O million)
Amount % No. of Loans
Electric power and gas 231,680 65.4 25
Transportation 38,511 10.9 1 4
Mining and manufacturing 38,387 10.8 2
(industry)
Telecommunications 6,158 1.7 2
Agriculture 2,997 0.8 1
Development loans 36,787 10.4 4
(financial intermediary
loans under AJDF)
Source: Japanese Contribution to Economic Development of Malaysia
through OECF Loans, March 1989, The OECF, Japan.
The figures show that more than 75% of the loans went to fund
infrastructural projects such as electric power and gas,
transportation, and telecommunications. This suggests there is an
indirect aim in that such infrastructural development facilitates
Japanese investment in Malaysia. Japanese factories producing
electronic products, of which there is a heavy concentration, have to
ensure the continuity of electricity supply for example. Moreover,
Japan imports natural gas from Malaysia, and infrastructural
development helps in its exploitation and transportation to Japan.
This suggests much of Japanese ODA is directed to those sectors that
could at least indirectly benefit Japanese business. Some Malaysian
officials defend such lending on the grounds that they fit into the
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recipients, in this case, Malaysia's, plans and priorities, and that other
needs such as educational and agricultural development already
have funding from other non-Japanese compared to other donors
agencies. In addition, the Japanese appear to be the ones willing to
commit the much greater amount of capital needed for such
infrastructural development. 6 2 While this is no doubt true, the fact
remains that not much Japanese ODA in Malaysia up to 1989 go to
the alleviation of poverty, for example. The willingness of Japan to
fund infrastructural projects on the other hand only increases the
belief in its readiness to help business.
Another complaint pertains to the effect of the revaluation of
the yen on concessional borrowing by Southeast Asian countries from
Japan. In 1985, as a result of what is known as the Plaza Accord, the
yen was revalued up to almost twice the value of the American
dollar. This had a deep impact on some Southeast Asian countries
which borrowed before this revaluation in yen, and almost overnight
is about twice indebted in American dollars. Malaysia is the most
vocal of the Southeast Asian countries regarding the injustice of such
a situation. According to figures given by an official of the Malaysian
Central Bank, as of December 31, 1987, Malaysia's total debt in yen
came to RM17.5 billion, of which the Japanese OECF (RM4.4 billion)
and the EXIM Bank (RM2.2 billion) accounted for RM6.6 billion, or
38%. He argued that as a result of the yen rising about 115% vis-a-
vis the ringgit between 1985 and 1988, the "loss" in official
assistance came to about RM3.5 billion and suggested that Malaysia
would have been better off borrowing in US dollars, even at market
rates.6 3 Malaysia, of all the ASEAN countries, is most affected by this
revaluation as can be seen from the figures in Table 10.
It can be seen that borrowing before 1985 i.e. in year 1984,
Malaysia borrowed the most of the four ASEAN countries, both in
terms of absolute amount and the percentage of the total Japanese
ODA it received. The others increased their loans after the
revaluation. It is no wonder the Malaysian government pressed the
Japanese government to do something to alleviate this debt burden
such as refinancing such loans at a more reasonable (lower) interest
rate. However, the Japanese government remained inflexible on the
grounds that its laws governing concessional loans have no such
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provisions (moreover changing them takes time) and that the
exchange rate risk was something that could not be helped. It was
however more conciliatory with new loans, and in March 1990
offered a big loan to Malaysia (the thirteenth yen loan) of ¥61 billion
at the favourable interest rate of 2.9%.
Table 1064
Japanese ODA to Four ASEAN Countries by Type, 1984-1988
Grant Technical Loan Grand L/GT
Cooperation Aid (L) Total (GT) (%)
Indonesia
1984 30.03 43.66 94.00 167.69 56.0
1985 31.06 45.28 84.99 161.33 52.7
1986 46.75 63.07 57.01 160.83 35.5
1987 68.70 67.88 570.72 707.31 80.7
1988 49.40 93.79 841.72 984.91 85.5
Philippines
1984 26.39 31.30 102.39 160.08 64.0
1985 39.96 29.75 170.29 240.00 70.1
1986 41.08 39.30 357.58 431.96 81.7
1987 66.89 44.90 267.60 379.38 70.5
1988 70.40 60.70 403.62 534.72 75.5
Thailand
1984 50.20 40.21 141.61 232.02 61.0
1985 76.54 40.69 146.87 264.10 55.6
1986 71.56 54.19 134.65 260.41 51.7
1987 62.92 72.64 166.88 302.44 55.2
1988 44.15 94.28 222.19 360.62 61.6
Malaysia
1984 11.03 24.81 209.31 245.15 85.4
1985 0.55 23.06 101.98 125.59 81.2
1986 7.06 36.43 5.73 49.22 1 1.6
1987 7.85 40.82 227.72 276.39 80.6
1988 2.89 54.74 32.80 90.44 36.3
Other complaints about Japanese ODA pertain to the belief that
Japanese businesses tend to benefit from ODA, whether the aid is
tied or untied (either through superior competitiveness or being in
the planning right from the beginning). Another one is the self-help
principle meaning that Japanese ODA has more loan than grants on
the grounds of the "self-help principle." This is however not
unanimous as a view. Other frequently heard complaints are the
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inordinate time spent in offering and implementing the loan (i.e.
Japanese study group after study group), and not enough locals are
involved.
Lately, Japanese ODA has responded to some of the criticisms
and have put more money in aiding manufacturing, the training of
human resources and so on. But it has also come out with a new ODA
charter that will link the dispensing of ODA with environmental
considerations and not too inordinate expenditure on arms. Such so-
called conditionalities are not viewed favourably by Southeast Asia,
at least not on the official level.
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